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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 confers jurisdiction over this appeal as a case 
transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
It is difficult to determine the precise issues Appellant John S. Dudley ("Dudley") is 
attempting to raise in the context of this appeal. Dudley makes a variety of assertions 
concerning various aspects of the trial conducted in this matter, but provides little direction 
concerning the exact issues Dudley is addressing on appeal. While it is not the responsibility 
of Appellee Utah First Credit Union ("Utah First") to frame the issues for Dudley's appeal, 
the following points appear to be the most pivotal issues raised by Dudley. 
Issue 1: Dudley's right to rescind the Note at issue expired on November 20, 2007. 
Therefore, Dudley's attempts to rescind the Note in February and March of 2010 had no 
legal effect, and Utah First was allowed to proceed with its foreclosure sale of the Property. 
The trial court correctly determined the invalid attempt to rescind did not require Utah First 
to release its security interest or seek any judicial approval before foreclosing the Property 
Issue 2: The trial court was not precluded from adjudicating issues relating to 
Dudley's attempted rescission under the Truth In Lending Act ("TELA") because Dudley 
raised such issues as an affirmative defense to the unlawful detainer action. 
Issue 3: The trial court properly denied Dudley's request to "exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction" over claims that Dudley filed in a separate federal lawsuit. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are mixed questions of fact and law. "[W]hen the 
trial court applies the facts of the case to the law then the question is a mixed question of fact 
and law, and the factual basis underpinning the decision is subject to a clearly erroneous 
standard." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 2006 UT 20, f l7, 133 P.3d 428. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802.5: 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if the person: 
(1) defaulted in his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the 
property by a trustee's sale or sheriff s sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or 
sheriffs sale after being served with a notice to quit by the 
purchaser. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-810: 
(1) In an action under this chapter in which the tenant remains in possession 
of the property: 
(a) the court shall expedite the proceedings, including the resolution of 
motions and trial; 
(b) the court shall begin the trial within 60 days after the day on which the 
complaint is served, unless the parties agree otherwise; and 
(c) if this chapter requires a hearing to be held within a specified time, the 
time may be extended to the first date thereafter on which a judge is available 
to hear the case in a jurisdiction in which a judge is not always available. 
(2) (a) In an action for unlawful detainer where the claim is for nonpayment 
of rent or for occupancy of a property after a forced sale as described in 
Subsection 78B-6-802.5, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, upon 
request of either party, within ten days after the day on which the defendant 
files the defendant's answer. 
(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection (2)(a): 
-2-
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(i) the court shall determine who has the right of occupancy during the 
litigation's pendency; and 
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between the parties can be 
adjudicated without further proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues 
and enter judgment on the merits. 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a): 
...in the case of any consumer credit transaction (including opening or 
increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan) in which a security 
interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is or will be 
retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling 
of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to 
rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the 
consummation of the transaction or delivery of the information and rescission 
forms required under this section together with a statement containing the 
material disclosures required under this title, whichever is later... 
15U.S.C. § 1605: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of the finance charge 
in connection with any consumer credit transaction shall be determined as the 
sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the 
credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an 
incident to the extension of credit. The finance charge does not include 
charges of a type payable in a comparable cash transaction. The finance 
charge shall not include fees and amounts imposed by third party closing 
agents (including settlement agents, attorneys, and escrow and title 
companies) if the creditor does not require the imposition of the charges or the 
services provided and does not retain the charges. Examples of charges which 
are included in the finance charge include any of the following types of 
charges which are applicable: 
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a 
point, discount, or other system of additional charges. 
(2) Service or carrying charge. 
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge. 
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report. 
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting 
the creditor against the obligor's default or other credit loss. 
-3-
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(6) Borrower-paid mortgage broker fees, including fees paid directly 
to the broker or the lender (for delivery to the broker) whether such 
fees are paid in cash or financed... 
15U.S.C. § 1602(aa): 
(A) the annual percentage rate at consummation of the transaction will 
exceed by more than 10 percentage points the yield on Treasury 
securities having comparable periods of maturity on the fifteenth day 
of the month immediately preceding the month in which the 
application for extension of credit is received by the creditor; or 
(B) The total points and fees payable by the consumer at or before closing 
will exceed the greater of-
(i) 8 percent of the total loan amount or; 
(ii) $400. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
On November 16, 2007, Dudley executed a Note, under which he borrowed 
$1,560,000.00 from Utah First. (Plaintiff s Exhibit 1.) To secure the Note, Dudley executed 
a Deed of Trust (the "Deed of Trust") granting Utah First a first position lien on the real 
property located at 8028 S. Madsen Court, Sandy, Utah (the "Property"). (Plaintiffs Exhibit 
7.) Dudley failed to timely make the payments required under the Note, and Utah First 
foreclosed its lien against the Property. (R. 1201.) Following the foreclosure sale, Utah First 
filed this action on March 29, 2010, to evict Dudley from the Property. (R. 1-7.) 
B. Course of proceedings 
A trial was held on June 21, 2010, June 29, 2010, and July 15, 2010. (R. 746-747, 
777, and 843.) At trial, Dudley raised as an affirmative defense that the foreclosure was 
improper because, prior to the sale he rescinded the loan. (R. 1201.) 
-4-
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C. Disposition at trial court 
On August 23, 2010, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law which rej ected Dudley's defenses to the unlawful detainer action and granted Utah First 
an order of restitution. Utah First was also awarded treble damages under the unlawful 
detainer statute for the period of time that Dudley unlawfully possessed the Property, as well 
as attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 1196-1205.) This appeal followed. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
As part of his appeal, Dudley attempts to challenge the trial court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. To show that the trial court relied on properly introduced evidence 
in making its Findings of Fact, Utah First will set forth each finding of fact, along with the 
relevant evidence in support of each. 
1. On November 16, 2007, Dudley executed an Adjustable Rate Note (the 
uNote "), wherein he borrowed $1,560,000.00 from Plaintiff The words, 'ADJUSTABLE 
RATE NOTE" are clearly and conspicuously printed at the top of the document, (R. 1197.) 
Evidentiary Support: The Note itself clearly states up front and center, in all caps, 
"ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE", and further states "THIS NOTE CONTAINS 
PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR CHANGES IN MY INTEREST RATE AND MY 
MONTHLY PAYMENTS. THIS NOTE LIMITS THE AMOUNT MY INTEREST RATE 
CAN CHANGE AT ANY ONE TIME AND THE MAXIMUM RATE I MUST PAY." 
(Plaintiff s Exhibit 1.) Paragraph 4(A) of the Note states in part, "[t]he interest rate I will pay 
-5-
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may change on the first day of January 2013, and on that day every 12th month thereafter." 
(Id.) Paragraph 4(D) of the Note states: 
The interest rate I am required to pay at the first Change Date will not be greater than 
8.625% or less than 4.625%. Thereafter, my interest rate will never be increased or 
decreased on any single Change Date by more than two percentage points (2.0%) 
from the rate of interest I have been paying for the preceding 12 months. My interest 
rate will never be greater than 12.65%. (Id.) 
The Note was in the amount of $1,560,000.00, stating: 
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay U.S. $1,560,000.00 (this 
amount is called 'Principal'), plus interest to the order of the Lender. The Lender is 
UTAH FIRST CREDIT UNION, I will make all payments under this Note in the form 
of cash, check, or money order. (Id.) 
The Note is dated 11/16/07 and is signed by Dudley. (Id.) Dudley verified that he had 
signed the Note. (R. 1257 at p. 47.) 
Several provisions of the Note provide for changes in the interest rate during the term 
of the Note. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1; R. 1257 at pp. 67 - 71.) 
The Note also contained an Adjustable Rate Rider, which stated in part, "[t]he interest 
rate I will pay may change on the first day of January 2013, and on that day every 12th month 
thereafter." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.) The Adjustable Rate Rider is also dated 11/16/07 and is 
signed by Dudley (Id.) 
2. Dudley agreed to repay the principal amount of the Note, plus interest 
according to the terms and conditions set forth in the Note. Dudley is an experienced and 
sophisticated business man. The Court finds incredible Dudley fs claim that he was a hapless 
dupewhohadno idea what he was signing and categorically rejects the same. (R. 1197-98.) 
-6-
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Evidentiary Support: The Note sets forth an agreement to repay the principal amount 
of the Note, plus interest: 
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay U.S. $1,560,000.00 
(this amount is called 'Principal'), plus interest to the order of the Lender. The 
Lender is UTAH FIRST CREDIT UNION, I will make all payments under this 
Note in the form of cash, check, or money order. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.) 
With respect to Dudley's business and investment activities, Dudley testified as follows: 
Q. Did you go to college? 
A. I did. 
Q. Where did you go to college? 
A. I went to Richmond College in the early days, and then I took 
different diplomas in courses after that. 
Q. What diplomas? What would you be talking about? 
A. I took diplomas in electrical engineering. I took them in financial 
derivatives. I've taken many different courses through the course 
of my life. 
Q. How many degrees would you say you have? 
A, The only one that Pve had qualified as a degree is the one in - well, 
two. One in construction and one in the amount of experience I've 
had through financial institutions. 
Q. In your coursework in financial derivatives, would that involve analysis 
of financial markets, financial transactions, what would that involve? 
A* That would involve transactions on the stock exchange, commodity 
exchange in London and in Europe. 
Q. What is your occupation now? 
A. Entrepreneur. 
Q. What would that mean in terms of your entrepreneurial ventures? 
A. I'm a consultant with RVPD, which is the company that Pm here 
with. I have about 10 or 12 different companies. 
Q. And what's the nature of your work with those companies? 
A. On a consulting basis. It's to establish businesses. It's to establish 
their offices to get the staff up and running. 
Q. Okay. How long have you been involved in this industry? 
A. Which industry? 
Q. The industry that you just talked about. 
-7-
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A. Ten years. 
Q. Okay, so were you doing the same type of work when you got the loan 
from Utah First in 2007? 
A. Did I get the loan? 
Q. Is it fair to say that your were doing the same type of work when you 
got the loan in 2007? 
A. I was employed by - employed by RVPD Consultants as a 
consultant I was CEO. I sent the company up here in the U.S. 
Q. Tell me a little bit more about what your duties would involve as a 
consultant and CEO? 
A. It would be to take office space. It would be to hire staff. It would 
be to organize the equipment, to set up the basic nature of the 
businesses. 
Q. Would you negotiate and enter into contracts? 
A. Sometimes, yes. Sometimes very short-term contracts. 
Q. Short-term and long-term? 
A. There was (Inaudible) agreements. 
Q. Okay? 
A. It might have been an option on the property, just a short, one-page 
document. 
Q. Okay. What other types of j obs have you had in the past, say since high 
school or the equivalent? 
A. Does that have to do with the loan? 
Q. Just in terms of your experience and your past dealings? 
A. I've had contract companies, I've worked in the construction 
industry. I've worked in the sales industry, and I've worked in the 
financial industry. 
Q. Okay. And in those various positions is it safe to say that you've been 
involved with a number of different types of contracts? 
A. I have, yes. 
(R. 1257 at pp. 55-58.) 
Dudley further testified: 
Q. Okay. And where did you get the money to purchase the home? 
A, Out of my bank account. 
Q. But where did the money come from, the source of it? 
A. That was my interest, my income, my personal bank account. 
Q. Was it from your employment, was it from other investments, was is 
from the sale of properties, what was the source of that income? 
-8-
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A. Most of it was - in ' 07 was from seminars, training courses that I 
was doing. 
Q. Okay. Do you personally engage in other investments? 
A. Do I? 
Q. Do you, yourself, invest in any commodities, stocks, real property? 
A. I have a couple of 4X accounts, personal trade 4X accounts, 
Q. Okay. Explain what that would be. Is that stock exchange? 
A. Foreign currency. It's - it's basically buying and selling different 
currencies. And we do charting and technical analysis to see 
whether we think the price is going up or down, and then we take 
a position, either one. 
(R. 1257 at p. 63.) 
3. The Note provided for a fixed rate of interest for five (5) years, and then 
switched to a variable rate of interest thereafter. (R. 1198.) 
Evidentiary Support: Section 4 of the Note, which was dated November 16, 2007, 
stated in relevant part: 
4. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES 
(A) Change Dates 
The interest rate I will pay may change on the first day of JANUARY, 2013, 
and on that day every 12th month thereafter. Each date on which my interest 
rate could change is called a "Change Date." 
*** 
(E) Effective Date of Changes 
My new interest rate will become effective on each Change Date. I will pay 
the amount of my new monthly payment beginning on the first monthly 
payment date after the Change Date until the amount of my monthly payment 
changes again. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.) 
4. To secure performance of his obligations under the Note, Dudley granted Utah 
First a security interest in the Property by executing a Deed of Trust, naming Utah First as 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
beneficiary. The Deed of Trust was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
(R. 1198.) 
Evidentiary Support: Received into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 was a copy of 
the Deed of Trust bearing the recording information from the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office. In relevant part, the Deed of Trust secured repayment of the Note by stating: 
This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of the Loan, and 
all renewals, extensions and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the 
performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security 
Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably grants, 
conveys and warrants to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale the following 
described property located in the COUNTY of SALT "LAKE.. .which currently 
has the address of 8028 South Madsen Ct., Sandy, Utah 84093. 
(Id) 
5. Prior to the closing of the loan, Utah First provided Dudley a Good Faith 
Estimate that set forth the charges associated with the Note. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 is a good 
faith estimate that indicates it was prepared on November 15, 2007, and signed by Dudley 
on that same date. (R. 1198.) 
Evidentiary Support: Received into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 was a true and 
correct copy of a Good Faith Estimate containing the estimated fees associated with the Note. 
(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 7.) The Good Faith Estimate was signed by Dudley on 11/15/2007. 
(Id) 
6. The closing of the loan occurred on November 16, 2007. At the closing Dudley 
was provided three (3) copies of a Notice of Right to Cancel. Dudley was also given the 
Settlement Statement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 13.) and a number of other documents. (R. 1198.) 
-10-
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Evidentiary Support: Received into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 were copies of 
three separate documents entitled "NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL". Dudley received 
the Notices of Right to Cancel and discussed them at the time of closing. (R. 1287 at p. 38.) 
Dudley signed each of the three Notices. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5.) 
7. The Notice of Right to Cancel clearly explained Dudley 3s right to cancel the 
Note. (R. 1198.) 
Evidentiary Support: Each Notice of Right to Cancel stated in relevant part: 
YOUR RIGHT TO CANCEL 
You are entering into a transaction that will result in a mortgage/lien/security 
interest on your home. You have the legal right under federal law to cancel 
this transaction, without cost, within THREE (3) BUSINESS DAYS from 
whichever of the following event occurs last: 
(1) the date of the transaction, which is NOVEMBER 16, 2007; or 
(2) the date you receive your Truth-in-Lending disclosures; or 
(3) the date you received this notice of your right to cancel. 
If you cancel the transaction, the mortgage/lien/security interest is also 
cancelled. Within 20 CALENDAR DAYS after we receive your notice, we 
must take the steps necessary to reflect the fact that the mortgage/lien/security 
interest on your home has been cancelled; and we must return to you any 
money or property you have given to us or to anyone else in connection with 
this transaction. 
You may keep any money or property we have given you until we have done 
the things mentioned above, but you must then offer to return the money or 
property. If it is impractical or unfair for you to return the property, you must 
offer its reasonable value. You may offer to return the property at your home 
or at the location of the property. Money must be returned to the address 
below. If we do not take possession of the money or property within 20 
CALENDAR DAYS of your offer, you may keep it without further obligation. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 5.) 
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8* The Notice of Right to Cancel contained language necessary to make it an 
appropriate form that Dudley could have used to rescind the Note, (R. 1198.) 
Evidentiary Support: The Notices of Right to Cancel (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5.) stated: 
HOW TO CANCEL 
If you decide to cancel this transaction, you may do so by notifying us in 
writing at: 
UTAH FIRST CREDIT UNION 
208 East 800 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
You may use any written statement that is signed and dated by you and states 
your intention to cancel and/or you may use this notice by dating and signing 
below. Keep one copy of this notice because it contains important information 
about your rights. If you cancel by mail or telegram, you must send the notice 
no later than MIDNIGHT of NOVEMBER 20, 2007 (or MIDNIGHT of the 
THIRD BUSINESS DAY following the latest of the three events listed above). 
If you send or deliver your written notice to cancel some other way, it must be 
delivered to the above address no later than that time. 
I WISH TO CANCEL 
Date: 
9. At the closing, Dudley was given the opportunity to sign a confirmation (the 
(<
 Confirmation ") that the three-day rescission had passed, Dudley was not required to sign 
the Confirmation at closing, but was given the option of signing the Confirmation back three 
days later if he chose not to sign it at the closing. (R. 1199.) 
Evidentiary Support: Aimee Ellett, the escrow officer that supervised the loan closing 
on November 16, 2007, testified as follows: 
Q. • Could you turn to Plaintiffs Number 5, Notice of the Right to Cancel. 
Did you witness Mr. Dudley's signature on that document? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. If we could talk about that for just a minute. Let me get my copy here 
so I can point you to where I want you to go (Discussion off the 
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Record.) Okay, with respect to the certification of confirmation at the 
bottom? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you explain, please, what you explained to Mr. Dudley in 
connection with his execution of this document? 
A. Yes, I will. On the right to cancel, I let everybody know, or let 
John know that: "This document is your right to cancel. You have 
three full business days to go over all the documents that you 
signed today, make sure that you feel good about the loan. I need 
you to sign here that you've received this right to cancel and that 
you're aware that you have three full business days. If you, for 
some reason, wanted to cancel, you'd want to sign up above under 
'I wish to cancel,' date it and get it to the Credit Union within those 
three days. 
"Down below, you're confirming that you've received two copies 
of this document to take with you today and it is your choice if you 
would like to sign the document, bring it back in three days or you 
may sign it today." 
Q. And you explained all this to him at the closing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you give him whatever time he wished to have to review the 
document and ask any questions he wished to have? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did he express to you at that time that he would rather have you 
take that certificate of confirmation at that time or that he preferred to 
deliver it later. 
A. He thought - he just signed it at the time and didn't say anything 
about wanting to deliver it later. 
Q. What is your normal practice with that document when that is done at 
the closing? 
A. My normal practice with that document is that I always give the 
option to whoever is signing the document that they may do what 
they choose. I have never had anybody take it home and want to 
bring it back and deal with it in three days. Everybody has always 
wished to sign it there. Some people have asked to post-date it, the 
three days. If that's their choice, I will allow it. Not a fan of that. 
I prefer documents dated on the day of, and then have the lender 
condition me for it if they'd like it dated differently, which I have 
had lenders condition after the fact and saying: No, I want this re-
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dated and initialed. But I'll usually let them condition me for it for 
me if that's what they'd like. 
Q. Did Utah First ever instruct you that he had to sign that confirmation, 
that closing, or they would not fund the loan? 
A. No, they did not. 
(R. 1256 atpp. 109-112.) 
10. Dudley was given three business days in which he could have rescinded the 
Note. In fact, the loan did not fund until four business days after closing. (R. 1199.) 
Evidentiary Support: Regarding the recission period Dudley testified as follows: 
Q. And down below, it has a section that tells you how to cancel and 
directly below that it says, "I wish to cancel." And that section has 
been left blank, correct? 
A, Correct 
Q. In fact, it's been your testimony that you did not want to cancel, is that 
correct? 
A. At the time, we were just in the middle of signing. 
Q. Right. You wanted the funds that they were going to give you on the 
loan? 
A- Yes. 
Q. Okay. And during that process, if you had any concerns about that, is 
it fair to say that you would have cancelled the loan? 
A. If I'd had any concerns, yes. 
Q. Okay. So, the fact that you didn't cancel it would indicate that you 
didn't have any concerns about the loan? 
MR. COREY: Objection. Calls for a legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: It says I have three days. 
MR. BINGHAM: Right, and you indicated if you had concerns you 
would have canceled the loan, but you didn't. So, I'm just trying to 
confirm that would indicate that you did not have any concerns about 
the loan, correct? 
A. At the time, correct. 
Q. Okay. 
And you did, in fact, receive the loan - the funds that Utah First 
promised you on November 21st, 2007, is that correct? 
A. We can see that from the accounts, yes. 
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Q. Yes. 
But they did, in fact, deliver on their promise to give you the money, 
correct? 
A. They put it in my bank account, yes-
Q. And you signed this on - it says, "November 16th"? 
A. November 16th. 
Q. And that was put in your account on November 21st, correct? 
A. Correct 
Q. At the time you got the money, you never objected to them giving you 
the money, did you - giving you the money, did you? 
A. No. 
(R. 1257 at pp. 77-79.). 
11. Dudley was not required to waive his right of rescission and was not required 
to sign the confirmation that three business days had lapsed at closing as a condition for 
obtaining the funds under the Note, (R. 1199.) 
Evidentiary Support: As set forth above, Aimee Ellett testified that Dudley was not 
required to sign the confirmation at closing as a condition for obtaining the funds under the 
Note. (R. 1256 at pp. 109-112.) 
12. The Court finds Dudley voluntarily chose to sign the confirmation section on 
the Notice of Right to Cancel as a convenience to him. (R. 1199.) 
Evidentiary Support: As set forth above, Aimee Ellett testified after explaining that 
Dudley could wait three days to sign the confirmation section of the Notice of Right to 
Cancel he simply signed the confirmation without saying anything about signing it later. (R. 
1256 at p. 111.) Additionally, David Bastian, the loan officer for Utah First, who was 
present at the closing testified as follows: 
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Q. Okay. Let me refer you to Exhibit - Plaintiffs Exhibit 5. Do you remember 
going over that document? 
A. I remember the escrow officer going over i t 
Q. Okay. And how did that happen? 
A. Well, these are your standard right of rescission documents. Mr. Dudley 
signs three of them. 
Q. Can you take a look at that line in the middle there, the notice to - the receipt. 
It's unsigned. Do you remember anything about the day, why that wasn't 
signed. 
A. It looks like it's signed to me. 
Q. Right there. The date right here. Right there, being right above the signature; 
the right to cancel? 
A. Well, Mr. Dudley signed it and dated it. I have no idea why there is not 
a date on that particular line. 
Q. And is - and what about the bottom signature, did he sign that on the same day 
as well? 
A. He would have signed the same day as a convenience to Mr. Dudley, but 
he would have also been explained that he's not - that he still has his 
rights to rescind within the three days. The only reason that you have him 
sign that is basically so they don't have to come in in thee days and sign 
again. That's pretty standard. 
Q. Okay. So, that was standard course of business for Utah First? 
A. That's the standard course of business for the entire mortgage industry. 
Q. To - explain that standard course of business. 
A. Well, the three-day right of rescission is a federal law. If you're putting 
any financing on your own personal property, you have three days to 
cancel the transaction, and you sign that you understand that you have 
those three days. That was explained very clearly to Mr. Dudley; would 
have been. 
And then at the end of those three days, Mr. Dudley has to come in and 
sign that the three days have passed and that he doesn't wish to rescind 
the loan. It's pretty customary and standard to offer the borrower the 
right to sign it now, explaining that it doesn't take any away any of this 
rights. He still can cancel. It just saves him a trip at the end of three days 
to come in and say that he doesn't wish to cancel. If he wishes to cancel, 
he can still cancel within the three-day period. It's pretty much standard. 
Q. Okay. 
A. This would have been all explained by the escrow officer. 
Q. Okay. But that's the standard explanation that you understand that he would 
have conveyed to Mr. Dudley, if he'd asked? 
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A. Well, that's explained whether he asks or not. In the course of explaining 
this document, the escrow officer gets to that point and says: Unless you 
don't feel like you're going to rescind, and you don't want to have to come 
in in three days, then go ahead and sign this now and then you won't have 
to come in. However, it doesn't take away any of your rights to rescind 
this loan within the three-day period; has absolutely no effect other than 
save you a trip in coming in in three days and discussing or signing this 
document. 
Q. Okay. But do you remember that specific conversation with Mr. Dudley? 
A. I don't remember it specifically, but that's the conversation that takes 
place at every closing that I've ever attended. 
(R. 1256 at pp. 189-92.) 
13. Also at closing, Dudley was given a Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement. 
The Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement: 
a. Identified the lender in the upper-left-hand corner; 
b: Contained a table that clearly stated the amount financed; 
c. Stated that the borrower had the right to receive an itemization of the amount 
financed; 
d. Clearly stated the finance charge; 
e. Stated the annual percentage rate; 
f Clearly stated the amount financed and the total of payments; 
g. Stated the number of payments and due date; 
h. Contained descriptive explanations of the terms "amountfinanced", "finance 
charge", "annual percentage rate", "total of payments"; 
i Contained a statement that security is being taken in the property and 
provided the address; 
j . Stated any dollar charge or percentage amount which may be imposed by a 
creditor solely on account of a late payment; 
k. Stated that borrower will not pay a penalty if the loan is paid off early and will 
not be entitled to a refund of part of the finance charge; 
L Contained a statement that the consumer should refer to the appropriate 
contract document for any information such document provides about 
nonpayment, default, the right to accelerate the maturity of the debt, and 
prepayment rebates and penalties; and 
m. Stated, "Assumption: someone buying your home may, subject to conditions, 
be allowed to assume the remainder of this mortgage on the original terms. " 
(R. 1199-1200.) 
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Evidentiary Support: Received into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 was a copy of 
the Federal Truth-In-Lending Disclosure Statement (the "Disclosure Statement"). Inspection 
of the Disclosure Statement reveals it contains all the provisions set forth in the trial court's 
Finding of Fact regarding the Disclosure Statement. {See Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.) 
14. Dudley elected to receive an itemization of the amount financed and was thus 
provided with a HUD-1 Settlement Statement that accurately reflected the finance charges, 
(R. 1200.) 
Evidentiary Support: With respect to the Settlement Statement provided to Dudley, 
















MR. BINGHAM: (Inaudible) what's been marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 
Number 13, could you identify that document? 
Yes, that's my Settlement Statement. 
And you prepared that? 
Yes, I did. 
And did you give that document to Mr. Dudley at closing? 
Yes, I did. 
And did you witness his signature at the end there? 
Yes. 
And in particular with the last page concerning the HUD 1 Addendum? 
Yes. 
Did you witness his signature to that? 
Yes, I did. 
Is that a complete and accurate copy of that document? 
Yes, the one that was signed at closing. This is a complete and accurate 
document. 
And if it did not have that last page attached to it, is it fair to say that would 
not be a complete copy? 
Yes, that would be fair to say. Sometimes - and I'm not positive in this 
case. I don't think that there was, but some lenders have their own 
attachment that they like attached to this, which we will do. This is my 
attachment. Lender may have an attachment. We also may have an FHA 
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attachment to the HUD if it's an FHA loan, and they like those attached. 
But this is my full document 
(R. 1256 at pp. 112-113.) 
15. The transaction surrounding Dudley's execution of the Note was not for the 
sale of any property or services. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: The Note was not for the sale of any property or services. 
Dudley testified that the loan was a refinance of his home as follows: 
Q. Okay. When you did this loan, you offered as collateral the home that you're 
currently living in. And I think you did testify that you live in that home, 
correct? 
A, 8028 Madsen Court? 
Q, Okay. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at the time you did the loan with Utah First, you owned that free and 
clear, correct? 
A. I did. 
(R. 1257atp.62.) 
16. The proceeds advanced under the Note were not for the purchase of the 
Property. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: As set forth above, the reason for the loan was a refinance of the 
home previously owned outright by Dudley. {See R. 1257 at p.62.) 
17. At the time the Note was executed, the amount borrowed by Dudley under the 
Note did not exceed the fair market value of the Property. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: Received into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit 9 was an 
appraisal report for the Property dated 11/10/2007, which reported that the Property had a 
value of $1,950,000.00. {See Defendant's Exhibit 9.) 
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18. [Dudley]failed to make the monthly payments required by the Note. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: Mike Bridge, Collections Manager for Utah First, testified that 





















Okay. To your knowledge, did John Dudley borrow $1,560,000 from Utah 
First? 
Yes. 
And did Mr. Dudley make the payments as agreed? 
No, he did not. 
Did Utah First undertake collection? 
Yes, we did. 
And did these collection efforts involve foreclosure on the home that secured 
this payment? 
Yes, they did. 
At any time from November 16th until February - sorry, from November 16th, 
2007 until February 2009, did John Dudley or anyone on his behalf deliver any 
written notice of recission to Utah First? 
No. 
Once Utah First commenced foreclosure proceedings, did Mr. Dudley -
MR. COREY: Objection, Your Honor; that's the argument. 
THE COURT: There's no question pending, overruled. 
MR. RUPP: Once Utah First commenced foreclosure proceedings, did Mr. 
Dudley ever pay the reinstatement amount? 
No. 
At the time of the foreclosure sale was the loan current? 
No, it was not. 
How delinquent was the loan at the time of the foreclosure sale? 
It was delinquent for October 5th, 2009. 
Okay, do you know when the foreclosure sale took place? 
March 18th, 2010. 
Okay. So how many months is that, five? 
(No audible response.) 
At any t ime-
THE COURT: Five months from? 
MR. RUPP: He was five months' delinquent. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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MR. RUPP: At any time, after the purported attempted recission from Mr. 
Dudley, has he offered to pay back the money he received under the loan to 
Utah First? 
A, No. 
Q. Has he ever come in and attempted to pay back the money -
A. No. 
Q. - he received from Utah First? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Utah First purchase the home at the foreclosure sale? 
A. Yes, we did. 
(R. 1256 pp. 79-82.) 
19. Plaintiff appropriately commenced foreclosure proceedings due to Dudley's 
failure to make the payments required by the Note, (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: As set forth above, Mike Bridge, Utah First's Collections 
Manager, testified that Utah First commenced foreclosure actions and purchased the Property 
at the foreclosure sale. (See R. 1256 pp. 79-82.) 
20. Prior to the foreclosure sale of the Property, Dudley attempted to rescind the 
Note. The evidence presented shows Dudley may have attempted to rescind the Note as early 
as February 2, 2010, or as late as March 18, 2010. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: Defendant introduced a letter from Fresh Start Financial dated 
February 2, 2010, attempting to rescind the loan. (See Defendant's Exhibit 2.) 
21. Dudley has never attempted to tender back to Plaintiff the funds he received 
under the Note. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: As set forth above, Mike Bridge, Utah First's Collections 
Manager, testified that Dudley never attempted to tender back the funds he received under 
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the Note to Utah First (R. 1256 pp. 81-82.) Additionally, Dudley himself testified that he 
did not attempt to tender back the funds as follows: 
MR. BINGHAM: The question is: At the time you had Fresh Start take those 
actions for you in February, did you return the money to the Credit Union that 
you had borrowed from them? 
A. That wasn't the next step. 
Q. Did you return the money to the Credit Union that you had borrowed 
from them, is the question? 
A. No, I hadn't. 
Q. Okay. When you attempted to rescind the loan in March, did you return 
to the Credit Union the money that they had lent you? 
A. No, not at that time. 
Q. Okay. In fact, at no point in time to this day, have you attempted or 
offered to return the money to the Credit Union, isn't that true? 
A. That's not the procedure I understand. (Inaudible). 
Q. That's not the question. The question is: Have you ever, to this day, 
attempted to return the money to the Credit Union that they lent you? 
A. No. 
(R. 1257 at pp. 97-98.) 
22. On March 18, 2010, a foreclosure sale was conducted and Utah First 
purchased the Property for $900,000.00 as the highest bidder. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: Michael Bridge testified that Utah First purchased the Property 
on March 18,2010, at the foreclosure sale. (R. 1256 atp. 81.) A copy of the Trustee's Deed 
recorded following the sale was submitted to the trial court as an exhibit to Utah First 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 316-317.) The Trustee's 
Deed stated that the Property was sold to Utah First for the sum of $900,000.00. (Id.) The 
price paid by Utah First at the foreclosure sale was never disputed by Dudley. 
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23. On March 22, 2010, a Notice to Vacate was served on Dudley and all other 
occupants of the Property. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: The Notice to Vacate was received as Plaintiff s Exhibit 12. The 
Service Affidavit states it was served on March 22, 2010. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.) 
24. The Notice to Vacate expired on March 27,2010. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: The Notice to Vacate stated: "Within five (5) days after service 
of this notice, you are hereby required to vacate and deliver possession of the Property now 
held and occupied by you to the undersigned..." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.) The affidavit of 
service for the Notice to Vacate indicates that it was served on March 22, 2010. (Id.) Five 
days following the date of service was March 27, 2010. 
25. [Utah First]1 filed a complaint for eviction on March 29, 2010. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: See Complaint for Eviction. (R. 1-8.) 
26. To date, Dudley has not vacated the Property. (R. 1201.) 
Evidentiary Support: Dudley testified on June 29, 2010, that his address was 8028 
Madsen Court, Sandy, Utah 84093 (the address of the Property). (R. 1257 at p. 17.) 
Furthermore, it was simply undisputed that Dudley continued to reside in the Property up 
through the trial. If Dudley had vacated the property prior to trial, there would have been no 
need for a trial regarding unlawful detainer. 
!The Findings of Fact actually state Dudley filed a complaint for eviction. However, this 
is a typographical error as the complaint for unlawful detainer was clearly filed by Utah First. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Dudley has failed to properly marshal the evidence, which is required to adequately 
challenge the trial court's findings of fact. He fails to adequately cite to the record, and 
recites little or no case law supporting his arguments. He also attempts to raise new issues 
and arguments for the first time on appeal. This alone justifies a denial of Dudley's appeal. 
Utah First was allowed to complete the foreclosure of the Property and eviction in 
spite of Dudley's attempt to rescind the loan in February and March 2010. Dudley's 
attempted rescission had no effect because his right to rescind expired three business days 
following the closing of the loan on November 16,2007. The trial court properly determined 
the disclosures provided by Utah First prior to and at the loan closing on November 16,2010, 
complied with the requirements of TILA. Therefore, Dudley's right of rescission expired 
three business days after the closing. 
The trial court properly adjudicated the unlawful detainer issues by holding a trial and 
issuing an order of restitution. The trial court also properly denied Dudley's request that it 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims which Dudley had filed in a separate federal 
lawsuit. Dudley did not file any counterclaims in the unlawful detainer action, and he did 
not file a motion to consolidate this action and the federal lawsuit. Dudley's request was also 
untimely presented, since it was not brought until the day of trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Dudley has failed to marshal the evidence, and raises issues for the first time on 
appeal. 
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A. Dudley has failed to marshal evidence. 
Dudley's appeal fails to property marshal the relevant evidence, which is required to 
challenge the factual findings of the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court explained the 
standard of review for a trial courts findings of fact when it said: 
A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In 
order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, an 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. If the evidence is 
inadequately marshaled, the reviewing court assumes that all findings are 
adequately supported by the evidence. 
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, [^19, 100 P.3d 1177 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court further explained what it means when it requires that an appellant 
"marshal the facts": 
To properly marshal the evidence in the record, the challenging party must 
temporarily remove its own prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's 
position; he or she must play the devil's advocate. In so doing, appellants must 
present the evidence in a light most favorable to the district court, and not 
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case. Appellants 
cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record in 
support of their position. Nor can they simply restate or review evidence that 
points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the district court's finding 
of fact. 
Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, ^ 20,233 P.3d489 (citations omitted). 
Dudley has failed to marshal the facts as required by Chen and Ostermiller. He makes 
numerous allegations without reciting any evidentiary support. He claims in several 
instances that the trial court committed various errors, or that the evidence did not support 
the findings, but Dudley fails to provide any support in the record for his generic allegations. 
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Instead, Dudley's brief sets forth long, narrative paragraphs in which he tries to construe 
evidence in a light most favorable to his case, but simply provides no indication that any 
evidence was presented to the trial court to support his assertions. 
For example, Dudley argues the only disclosure he received in advance of the loan 
closing was the Good Faith Estimate (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4). (See Appellant's Brief at pp. 9-
10.) However, the very last line before Dudley's signature on the Good Faith Estimate states, 
"The undersigned acknowledges receipt of the booklet, 'Settlement Costs,' and if applicable 
the Consumer Handbook on ARM Mortgages." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4) Introduced as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 was a copy of the Consumer Handbook on ARM Mortgages of which 
Dudley acknowledged receipt by his signature on the Good Faith Estimate. When presented 
in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, it is clear Dudley did receive 
disclosures regarding the adjustable rate feature of the Note. 
Second, Dudley argues he was overcharged for a credit report fee by $55.70. (See 
Appellant's Brief at p. 10-11.) Dudley seems to point to this issue to support his argument 
that the trial court was mistaken in its Findings of Fact that Utah First provided proper 
disclosures under TILA. However, Dudley fails to provide any legal support to indicate how 
this issue makes the loan disclosures invalid. TILA only requires that Utah First properly 
disclose the finance charges being charged to Dudley. How much Utah First paid for a credit 
report is irrelevant under TILA. The only question is whether or not Utah First disclosed the 
amount it charged to Dudley. By Dudley's own admission he paid $150.00 for the credit 
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report. (Id.) Utah First disclosed the $ 150.00 charge to Dudley on line 804 of the Settlement 
Statement prepared by Amy Ellett. (See Plaintiff s Exhibit 13.) 
Third, Dudley alleges Utah First intentionally failed to produce an appraisal report in 
its discovery responses. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 11.) However, the record shows (l)the 
appraisal report was produced prior to trial; (2) any failure to produce the report sooner was 
inadvertent; and (3) the failure to produce the report sooner was not prejudicial to Dudley. 
(R. 1256 at pp. 5 and 19.) Moreover, Dudley recites no facts or law indicating how the 
appraisal report somehow invalidated the foreclosure of the Property or the eviction action 
filed by Utah First. 
Fourth, Dudley alleges that Plaintiff s Exhibit 13, the Settlement Statement prepared 
by the closing office Aimee Ellett, was altered. Dudley suggests the last page of Plaintiff s 
Exhibit 13 was in fact the last page of Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, and that no evidence was 
presented that Mr. Dudley received the Settlement Statement prepared by Ms. Ellett. Thus, 
the $42.99 Survey to Pest Inspection to Cottonwood Improvement District Fee2 (the "Survey 
Fee") was not disclosed to Dudley. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 13.) To the contrary, Aimee 
Ellett, the escrow officer who prepared the Settlement Statement in question, testified at trial 
that Plaintiffs Exhibit 13, including the last page, which is identified as an Addendum To 
HUD-1 Settlement Statement, was a complete document. (R. 1256 atp. 113.) Ms. Ellett also 
2
 The $42.99 fee was disclosed to Dudley. However, as set forth below, even if the fee 
was not disclosed it makes no difference because TILA only requires disclosure of finance 
charges as such term is defined by TILA. The pest inspection fee was not a finance charge. 
Therefore, it did not need to be disclosed. 
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testified she personally witnessed Dudley sign the Addendum to the HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement (Id.) The Settlement Statement unambiguously identifies the $42.99 Survey Fee 
at line 1301-1303. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 13.) Moreover, Dudley presented no evidence 
that this charge was a "finance charge" covered by the requirements of TILA. When viewed 
in light most favorably to the trial court's decision, it is evident the Settlement Statement, 
including Addendum 1 thereto, was delivered to Dudley on the date of closing and that the 
$42.99 Survey Fee was properly disclosed. 
Due to Dudley's failure to marshal the evidence, this Court must assume that all of 
the trial court's findings are adequately supported by the evidence. 
B. Dudley raises issues for the first time on appeal that were not properly 
raised or preserved at trial. 
For the first time on appeal, Dudley argues that his wife did not receive the required 
loan disclosures or a Notice of Right to Cancel. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 16.) Dudley's 
wife is not a party to this action, and she is not a borrower under the Note. As such, there 
was no obligation to provide Mrs. Dudley with the loan disclosures or a Notice of Right to 
Cancel. Dudley has recited no authority demonstrating any requirement to provide the TILA 
disclosures to a non-borrower, and this issue was never raised by Dudley before the trial 
court. As such, this is not an issue properly before this Court in this appeal. 
"In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court 
in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main Street 
v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 7 8 4 51, 99 P.3d 801 (citing Brookside Mobile Park v. Peebles, 
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2002 UT 48 U 14, 48 P.3d 968.) There was no evidence presented at trial that Mrs. Dudley 
had any interest in the Property. John Dudley was the only borrower under the Note. (See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.) John Dudley alone executed the Deed of Trust. (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 7.) Under the Deed of Trust, Dudley covenanted he "is lawfully seized of the estate 
hereby conveyed and has the right to grant, convey and warrant the Property and that the 
Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record." Finally, by his own 
admission, Dudley alone purchased the Property. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 9.) Any 
reference to Mrs. Dudley's purported interest in the Property or purported right to receive the 
loan disclosures at issue are not properly part of this appeal, and should be disregarded. 
Dudley also raises for the first time, that the unlawful detainer action was somehow 
barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-809(2). This issue was not presented at trial, and cannot 
now be raised for the first time. Moreover, Dudley's reliance on § 78B-6-809(2) is 
misplaced. This particular code section deals only with a trial concerning forcible entry or 
forcible detainer. Dudley did not make any claims for forcible entry or forcible detainer, 
making § 78B-6-809(2) wholly inapplicable to this matter. As such, Dudley's references to 
this issue should be summarily disregarded. 
II. The trial court properly concluded that Utah First complied with TILA. 
Dudley argues he did not receive the disclosures required under TILA, and that the 
disclosures presented at trial did not comply with TILA's requirements. Again, Dudley fails 
to marshal the evidence. In attempting to challenge the sufficiency of Utah First's 
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disclosures, Dudley sets forth several facts without any reference to the record. Such facts 
must be disregarded as being not supported by the record. Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's decision, it is clear Dudley received the required TIL A 
disclosures. Since the required TILA disclosures were given to Dudley, his right to rescind 
the loan expired three business days after the closing. 
A. Dudley received the TILA disclosures. 
There is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Dudley received the TILA 
disclosures. Dudley argues he rebutted the presumption that the TILA disclosures were given 
by "testimony of Mr. Dudley, that the disclosures were not given." Appellant's Brief at p. 
24. However, Dudley has failed to cite where in the record he testified that he did not receive 
the documents. To the contrary, Dudley testified he did receive the disclosures: 
Q. Plaintiffs 2. What are you looking at there, what is that document? 
A- Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement. 
Q. Okay. I'm sorry. I wanted to give you 4. I apologize. What are you looking 
at there? 
A. Good Faith Estimate. 
Q. Did you see that? 
A. I did. This is signed by me. 
Q. Okay. And what date is on there? 
A. 11/15/07. 
Q. Okay. Alright. Take a look at that. Did you receive that document, and would 
you read the title of it? 
A. I did and it's the Federal Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement, 
November 16th, 2007. 
Q. And did you sign that? 
A. Idid. 
THE COURT: What document is that, please? 
MR. COREY: Two. 
THE WITNESS: Plaintiff 2. 
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MR. COREY: So had you ever - take a look back at what's marked number 4, Do 
you remember getting that document on the 15th and signing it? 
A. I didn't get to keep it, but I signed it at David's office, yes. 
Q. Did he give you a 6? What is Plaintiffs 6? What is the title of the document. 
A. This is Settlement Statement. 
Q. What is the date? 
A. The date is 11/16/07. 
Q. And is there a signature on that? 
A. It's my signature. 
Q. Do you remember receiving that? 
A. Yes I do. The content of it, I don't, but my signature is my signature and 
that's the way I write the date. 
Q. Did they give you any other disclosures about the cost of your loan besides that 
statement? 
A. I don't believe so. I think that was it. 
* * * 
Q. Okay. This is Plaintiffs Exhibit 5. 
Take a look at that. Was that titled? 
A. Notice of Right to Cancel. 
Q. What did you understand this to mean? 
A. That if I wanted to cancel the loan, I could. This was like a third of the 
way or halfway into the documents. And I remember asking the question, 
"Why do I want to cancel? We haven't finished signing up for it yet." So 
he said - he explained some things to me, told me that I need to - that I do 
have a right to cancel, that I need to sign this document here and this 
document here. Because I wasn't cancelling, I didn't have to sign the top 
one. 
(R. 1257 at p. 35-38.) 
In addition to Dudley's own testimony that he received the TILA disclosures, each 
disclosure bears his signature. (See Plaintiffs Exhibits 2,4, 5,6, and 13.) Aimee Ellett also 
testified that she delivered to Dudley the Notices of Right to Cancel, the Settlement 
Statement introduced as Plaintiffs Exhibit 13, and personally witnessed Dudley sign the 
same. (R. 1256 at pp. 109-113.) Finally, Dave Bastian, the loan officer for Utah First who 
was present at the closing testified that he remembered Aimee Ellett going over the Notice 
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ofRight to Cancel with Dudley. (R. 1256 at pp. 189-90.) The clear weight of the evidence 
shows Dudley did receive the TILA disclosures. 
Dudley argues the Notices of Right to Cancel were invalid because they were 
delivered to Dudley by Aimee Ellett, rather than Utah First. (Appellant's Brief at p. 25.) 
First, this argument is inconsistent with Dudley's prior argument that he didn't receive the 
disclosures. Second, as the escrow officer conducting the closing, Ms. Ellett would have 
provided the Notices ofRight to Cancel at the request of Utah First. Third, Dave Bastian, 
Utah First's loan officer was present when the Notices ofRight to Cancel were delivered to 
Dudley. (R. 1256 at pp. 189-92.) Fourth, Dudley provides no legal authority for the 
proposition that the disclosures must be handed to him directly by an employee of Utah First, 
rather than through its closing agent. Dudley's argument that he did not receive the Notices 
of Right to Cancel from Utah First is simply without merit, and is not supported by the 
evidence introduced at trial. 
B. There was no confusion regarding Dudley's right to cancel. 
Dudley next argues the instructions regarding how to rescind the Note were confusing. 
Aimee Ellett told Dudley that "[i]f you, for some reason, wanted to cancel, you'd want to 
sign up above under 'I wish to cancel,' date it and get it to the Credit Union within those 
three days." (R. 1256 at p. 110.) Based upon Dudley's background and experience, the 
Court found Dudley to be an experienced and sophisticated business man capable of 
understanding the loan documents and disclosures presented to him. (R. 1197-98.) The court 
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specifically found the Notice of Right to Cancel clearly explained his right to cancel the 
Note. (R. 1198.) Moreover, Dudley's claim that he was confused about the rescission 
process is contrary to his own actions when he attempted to rescind the Note in 2010. 
C. The cost associated with the Survey Fee and the appraisal fee were 
disclosed to Dudley. Even if they were not, they were not required to be 
disclosed because they were not finance charges. 
The trial court found all the finance charges that were required to be disclosed to 
Dudley were in fact disclosed to Dudley. Dudley argues Utah First failed to disclose a 
$42.99 Survey Fee and a $550.00 appraisal fee (the "Appraisal Fee"), but the record reflects 
these fees were disclosed to Dudley. Introduced and received as Plaintiffs Exhibit 13 was 
a Settlement Statement, which Amy Ellett testified was delivered to Dudley at the closing. 
(R. 1256 at p. 113.) That Settlement Statement disclosed both the Survey Fee, on line 1303, 
and the Appraisal Fee, on line 803. 
Dudley argues Ms. Ellett's testimony should be given no credit pursuant to Jackson 
v. U.S. Bank, 245 B.R. 23 (E.D. Pa. 2000), but Jackson is inapplicable to this matter. In 
particular, Jackson is the decision of a trial court, not an appellate court concerning the 
credibility of the witness. Credibility of witnesses is determined by the trier of fact. Jackson 
simply held that the particular escrow officer was not very credible because she had no 
specific recollection of the closing. That holding was very specific and dependent on the 
totality of the facts presented to the court in Jackson. There is absolutely no legal precedent 
that testimony of an escrow agent is per se unreliable. 
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"It is the duty of the finder of fact to weigh the testimony and determine its 
credibility." State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, fn 6 (Utah 1983). The assessment of Ms. Ellett's 
credibility must be left to Judge Himonas, the finder of fact. Judge Himonas accepted her 
testimony as credible, and rejected Dudley's testimony on the issue as not credible. Unlike 
the escrow office in Jackson, Ms. Ellett testified she had a specific recollection of the closing 
of Dudley's loan. (R. 1256 at p. 118.) It is not proper for this Court to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and Dudley has made no 
showing that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Dudley also argues the Settlement Statement introduced as Plaintiffs Exhibit 13 is 
inconsistent on its face, and that the addendum to Plaintiffs Exhibit 13 actually belonged on 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 6. This position was expressly rejected by Ms. Ellett's testimony (R. 1256 
at pp. 112-113.), and the documents themselves support the position that the addendum in 
question belongs on Exhibit 13. Exhibit 6 has numbered pages: 1 of 3, 2 of 3, and 3 of 3. 
Page 3 of 3 bears Dudley's signature and a verification that he has reviewed the HUD-1. (See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 6.) The addendum to Plaintiffs Exhibit 13 is a stand alone page, 
numbered "1 of 1", clearly identified as an addendum, and containing nearly the exact same 
verification as the last page of Plaintiff s Exhibit 6. It doesn't make sense for a settlement 
to have the same verification, one on the last page and one on the addendum. It makes more 
sense that the addendum containing Dudley's verification would be attached to a Settlement 
Statement that doesn't otherwise contain his signature or verification, such as the Settlement 
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Statement introduced as Plaintiff s Exhibit 13. The documents themselves, coupled with Ms. 
Ellett's testimony demonstrate Dudley received a copy of the Settlement Statement 
introduced as Plaintiffs Exhibit 13. Thus, the Survey Fee and Appraisal Fee were both 
disclosed to Dudley at the closing. 
Even if the Survey Fee and the Appraisal Fee were not disclosed it would not violate 
TILA. Only "finance charges" need to be disclosed under TILA, and the Survey Fee and 
Appraisal Fee are not "finance charges" as defined by TILA. 
15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) defines "material disclosures" as (1) the annual percentage rate, 
(2) the method of determining the finance charge, (3) the balance upon which a finance 
charge will be imposed, (4) the amount of the finance charge, (5) the amount to be financed, 
(6) the total of payments, (7) the number and amount of payments, (8) the due dates of 
payments, and (9) the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a). 15 U.S.C. § 1635 
requires disclosure of the obligor's right to rescind. 
15 U.S.C. § 1638 requires disclosure of the material disclosures defined in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1602(u) along with, (1) the identity of the creditor, (2) a statement of the obligor's right to 
obtain a written itemization of the amount financed, (3) the number, amount and due dates 
or period of payments, (4) descriptive explanations of the terms "amount financed", "finance 
charge", "annual percentage rate", "total payments", and "total sale price", (5) a statement 
that a security interest is being taken in the property, (6) any dollar amount that can be 
imposed by a late payment, (7) a statement indicating whether the borrower will be entitled 
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to a rebate, (8) a statement that the consumer should refer to the appropriate contract 
document for any information regarding nonpayment, etc. . . , and (9) if the transaction 
exceeds the fair market value of the principal dwelling securing the loan, a statement that 
portions of the interest may not be tax deductible and the consumer should consult a tax 
advisor. 
Based on the foregoing, the only charges required to be disclosed to Dudley were 
"finance charges," principal payments, and potential late fees. The Survey Fee and Appraisal 
Fee were certainly not late fees, and were not payments to principal. Therefore, they were 
only required to be disclosed if they were "finance charges." 15 U.S.C. § 1605 defines 
"finance charge" as: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of the finance charge in 
connection with any consumer credit transaction shall be determined as the sum of all 
charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended, 
and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of 
credit. The finance charge does not include charges of a type payable in a comparable 
cash transaction. The finance charge shall not include fees and amounts imposed by 
third party closing agents (including settlement agents, attorneys, and escrow and title 
companies) if the creditor does not require the imposition of the charges or the 
services provided and does not retain the charges. Examples of charges which are 
included in the finance charge include any of the following types of charges which are 
applicable: 
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a point, 
discount, or other system of additional charges. 
(2) Service or carrying charge. 
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge. 
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report. 
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting the 
creditor against the obligor's default or other credit loss. 
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(6) Borrower-paid mortgage broker fees, including fees paid directly to the 
broker or the lender (for delivery to the broker) whether such fees are paid in 
cash or financed. 
There was no evidence the Survey Fee and the Appraisal Fee were for any purpose 
other than what was listed on the Settlement Statement - e.g. a survey and appraisal. They 
were imposed by third parties, and were not finance charges. Consequently, they were not 
required to be disclosed under TILA. Dudley presented no evidence to the contrary. 
D. Utah First was not required to provide any disclosures under 15 U.S.C. § 
1639. 
The disclosures relating to the variable rate loan obtained by Dudley were proper. 
Dudley erroneously argues that 15 U.S.C. § 1639 required Utah First to provide disclosures 
subsequent to the good faith estimate provided to Dudley. (See Appellant's Brief at pp. 30-
31.) The provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1639 are inapplicable to the loan in this case. 
15 U.S.C. § 1639 requires certain additional disclosures for a loan referred to in 15 
U.S.C. § 1602(aa). A loan referred to in Section 1602(aa) is one where: 
(A) the annual percentage rate at consummation of the transaction will exceed by 
more than 10 percentage points the yield on Treasury securities having 
comparable periods of maturity on the fifteenth day of the month immediately 
preceding the month in which the application for extension of credit is 
received by the creditor; or 
(B) The total points and fees payable by the consumer at or before closing will 
exceed the greater of-
(i) 8 percent of the total loan amount or; 
(ii) $400. 
The Note at issue in the present case is not the kind referred to in Section 1602(aa). The 
annual interest rate at consummation was 6.625%, (see Plaintiffs Exhibit 1) far below the 
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10% above the yield on treasury securities and the total settlement charges for the Note were 
$20,107.10 (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 13). It is also far below the threshold of 8% of the loan 
amount, which would be $124,800.00. Because the Note was not the type of loan note 
referred to in Section 1602(aa), no additional disclosures were required under 15 U.S.C. § 
1639. As found by the trial court, Dudley knew he was signing a variable rate note. The 
words, "ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE" were unambiguously stated at the top of the Note, 
and several provisions of the Note refer to a variable interest rate. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 
1.) The disclosures provided to Dudley regarding the Note were proper. 
III. Utah First acted appropriately when it proceeded with the foreclosure following 
Dudley's invalid attempt to rescind the loan. 
The evidence at trial showed that Dudley's attempt to rescind the loan was nothing 
more than an effort to avoid a foreclosure following his failure to repay the Note as agreed. 
Dudley raised no issues concerning the origination of the loan for more than two years. It 
was only when he defaulted on the Note and was facing a foreclosure of the Property, that 
he suddenly tried to rescind the Note. Since Dudley's right to rescind the Note expired on 
November 20, 2007, Dudley's attempts to rescind in 2010 were without any legal effect. 
The foreclosure sale conducted March 18, 2010 was valid because Dudley's right to 
rescind the Note had long since expired. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) states in relevant part that: 
...in the case of any consumer credit transaction (including opening or 
increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan) in which a security 
interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is or will be 
retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling of 
the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to 
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rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the 
consummation of the transaction or delivery of the information and rescission 
forms required under this section together with a statement containing the 
material disclosures required under this title, whichever is later... 
Therefore, if the rescission forms and material disclosures required by TILA were provided 
at the closing, as they were in this case, the right to cancel or rescind expired three business 
days following the closing. The trial court found the disclosures to be in compliance with 
TILA, meaning Dudley's right to rescind the Note expired on November 20, 2007 — three 
business days after the closing of the loan. 
Dudley unsuccessfully argues that 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) requires Utah First to release 
the Deed of Trust and return all payments received under the Note, within twenty days after 
receipt of Dudley's Notice of Rescission. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 17.) The rescission 
procedures of TILA and Regulation Z relied on by Dudley apply only when there is a valid 
rescission. Dudley provided no support at trial that his attempt to rescind the Note was valid. 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) states in relevant part, "[w]hen an obligor exercises his right to rescind 
under subsection (a), he is not liable..." The pivotal word in § 1635 is right. If the borrower 
has no right of rescission, then an attempt to rescind has no legal effect and the lender has 
no duty to release its security interest or return loan payments. 
Many courts have recognized a lender's duties under § 1635 are only triggered when 
a valid rescission is exercised. SeeHopkinsv. FirstNCLFin. Serv.} 372B.R. 735,751 (E.D. 
Perm. 2007)("failure to honor a valid rescission is itself a TILA violation")(citations 
omitted)(emphasis added); Aquino v. Public Fin. Consumer District, 606 F.Supp. 504, 511 
-39-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(E.D. Penn. 1985)("After a creditor has performed its obligations pursuant to a valid 
rescission, the obligor must tender to the creditor any property the creditor has previously 
delivered to the obligor.")(emphasis added); Family Fin. Serv. v. Spencer, 41 Conn. App. 
754, 770,677 A.2d 479 (1995)("The creditor's failure to comply with such a valid rescission 
request obviates the consumer's obligation.")(citations omitted)(emphasis added); and Fisher 
v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2011 U.S.Dist LEXIS 60870, \ 9 (E.D. VA 2011)("Following 
valid rescission, the borrower 'is not liable for any finance or other charge,' including 
application fees, 'and any security interest given by the obligor... becomes void.'")(citations 
omitted)(emphasis added). There are literally dozens of cases reciting the actions that must 
be taken by a lender in the face of a valid rescission, however, there is no legal authority 
requiring a lender to release its interest or take any action whatsoever following an invalid 
attempt at rescission. In the present case, Dudley's attempt to rescind the loan was invalid. 
Therefore, the procedures at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) are inapplicable. 
As set forth in the facts above and more fully explained below, Dudley's right of 
rescission expired on November 21, 2007, three business days following the closing of the 
Note. Therefore, when he attempted to rescind the note his actions were in no way binding 
on Utah First and it was free to proceed with the foreclosure. If Dudley believed that Utah 
First was proceeding improperly, he could have sought an injunction. He did nothing and, 
as found by the trial court, the foreclosure was proper. 
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IV. The trial court properly adjudicated the unlawful detainer action. 
The case filed by Utah First was an unlawful detainer action, and nothing more. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-810 states in relevant part: 
(1) In an action under this chapter in which the tenant remains in possession 
of the property: 
(a) the court shall expedite the proceedings, including the resolution of 
motions and trial; 
(b) the court shall begin the trial within 60 days after the day on which the 
complaint is served, unless the parties agree otherwise; and 
(c) if this chapter requires a hearing to be held within a specified time, the 
time may be extended to the first date thereafter on which a judge is available 
to hear the case in a jurisdiction in which a judge is not always available. 
(2) (a) In an action for unlawful detainer where the claim is for nonpayment 
of rent or for occupancy of a property after a forced sale as described in 
Subsection 78B-6-802.5, the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, upon 
request of either party, within ten days after the day on which the defendant 
files the defendant's answer. 
(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with Subsection (2)(a): 
(i) the court shall determine who has the right of occupancy during the 
litigation's pendency; and 
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between the parties can be 
adjudicated without further proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues 
and enter judgment on the merits. 
Consistent with Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-810(2)(a), a hearing regarding occupancy 
was held on April 30, 2010, at Utah First's request. (R. 1249.) At the hearing, Judge Kelly 
determined there were issues requiring further proceedings. (R. 1249 at 28-32.) The case 
was also not resolved by either party's motion for summary judgment. (R. 519.) Therefore, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-810( 1 )(b) and (c), the trial court held a trial beginning 
on June 21, 2010, the first available date following 60 days after the complaint was served. 
(R. 746-747.) 
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A, The trial court complied with the eviction procedures found in Utah Code 
Ann. §786-6-801^5^. 
Dudley was guilty of unlawful detainer. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802.5 governs 
unlawful detainer following a foreclosure, and states: 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful 
detainer if the person: 
(1) defaulted in his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the 
property by a trustee's sale or sheriff s sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or 
sheriffs sale after being served with a notice to quit by the 
purchaser. 
Dudley defaulted in his obligations under the Note. (R. 1256 pp. 79-82.) A foreclosure sale 
of the Property was conducted, and Utah First purchased the Property as the highest bidder. 
(R. 1256 at p. 81; R. 316-317.) A Notice to Vacate was served on Dudley and all other 
occupants of the Property on March 22, 2010 {See Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.) Dudley failed to 
vacate the Property within the specified 5-day period. (R. 1257 atp. 17.), and was unlawfully 
detaining the Property thereafter. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-811, Utah First was 
entitled to an order of restitution and treble damages for the period of time that Dudley was 
unlawfully remaining in possession of the Property (March 27,2010 through July 15,2010). 
(R. 1203.) 
Dudley argues he was not guilty of unlawful detainer because he was in quiet 
possession of the Property for at least one year before the commencement of the unlawful 
detainer action. {See Appellant's Brief at p 21.) Dudley relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
6-809(2) for support of his position. This issue was not raised before the trial court, and 
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cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal. Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
809(2) does not apply to this matter because Dudley did not made any claims of forcible 
entry or forcible detainer. 
B. Adjudication of Dudley's affirmative defense of rescission was necessary 
to the adjudication of Utah First's claim of unlawful detainer. 
It was proper for the trial court to adjudicate Dudley's rescission rights under TILA. 
Dudley suggests that the trial court should not have adjudicated "[f]ederal 
law, well outside of the unlawful detainer statute, and outside of Utah First['s] claims as 
pled." (Appellant's Brief at p. 22.) However, it was Dudley, not Utah First, that made 
adjudication of Dudley's attempted rescission under TILA a necessary part of the unlawful 
action. Dudley's answer included the following affirmative defense: 
After being served with a Notice of Rescission, Utah First failed to take action to seek 
a judicial determination on the merits of John's rescission prior to exercising their 
power of sale from the trust deed. Upon exercise of John's federally protected right 
to rescission, Utah First's security interest is automatically void pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1635(b), and Utah First must take all the necessary steps to comply with the Truth 
in Lending Act within 20 days from the date of the rescission. 
(R.11.) 
Dudley's claim of rescission went right to the heart of Utah First's ownership of the Property 
and right to evict Dudley from the Property — e.g. if the loan was rescinded, then there was 
no foreclosure sale and no basis for an eviction. This was acknowledged by the trial court 
at a hearing held on April 30,2010: 
In his motion for summary judgment, [Dudley] claims to have exercised the right. He 
shows documentation suggesting that he's rescinding under 15 U.S.C. Section 1635, 
and without getting to the merits, but hypothetically, if that motion were granted the 
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whole transaction were set aside, then wouldn't you be in a circumstance where Utah 
First would not be an owner under 78B-6-801 Subpart 5, who would be even entitled 
to rights under the unlawful detainer statute? Doesn't that motion go to the heart of 
whether you even have the right to exercise those provisions? 
(R. 1249atp.l6.) 
It was impossible for the trial court to properly adjudicate possession of the Property 
without also adjudicating whether Dudley exercised a valid right of rescission. It is 
inconsistent for Dudley to raise an affirmative defense which attempts to block Utah First's 
right to possession of the Property, and then argue on appeal that adjudication of the 
affirmative defense he himself raised was improper. 
Dudley relies on the holding in Bichler v. DEI, 2009 UT 63,220 P.3d 1203, and Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to argue that the trial court should not have 
adjudicated the TILA issues. However, Dudley's reliance in Bichler and Rule 54(b) is 
misplaced. In Bichler, the question before the court is whether the defendant's counterclaims 
should have been dismissed because they were brought in an eviction proceeding. Id at f 
29. Bichler held the trial court properly adjudicated the unlawful detainer issue, but should 
not have dismissed the counterclaims. Id. at % 34. Dudley argues the present case is similar 
to Bichler stating, u[t]he district court summarily disposed of Mr. Dudley's contract claims, 
by making findings and conclusions, outside of the unlawful detainer statue, with blanket 
denial of Mr. Dudley's motion to re-frame trial structure..." (Appellant's Brief at p. 23.) 
Dudley also argues the trial court's actions violated Rule 54(b). (Appellant's Brief at p. 23.) 
Bichler and Rule 54(b) are both inapplicable because Dudley never asserted any contract 
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claims or any other counterclaims. This lawsuit consisted of a single action for unlawful 
detainer against Dudley, and Dudley's affirmative defenses raised in response thereto. 
It is nonsensical to suggest the trial court should not have heard the defenses raised 
by Dudley, when Dudley chose to pursue said defenses. If Dudley did not want those issues 
heard, he should not have chosen to raise those issues at trial. The trial court properly heard 
and made findings on the defenses Dudley chose to raise at trial, and should not be faulted 
for doing so. Dudley's argument to the contrary is inconsistent with the strategy of defense 
taken by Dudley in this matter, and must be rejected. 
G. The trial court properly denied Dudley's "Motion to Re-Frame Trial 
Structure, Stay Damages, and Supplemental Jurisdiction." 
On the day of trial, Dudley filed a Motion to Re-Frame Trial Structure, Stay Damages, 
and Supplemental Jurisdiction (the "Motion to Take Supplemental Jurisdiction"), in which 
he asked the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over certain claims filed by Dudley against 
Utah First in a federal lawsuit filed in the United States District Court, District of Utah 
encaptionedDudley v. UtahFirst, etal, CaseNo. 10-00562 (the "Federal Lawsuit"). (R. 541-
543.) In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court properly denied 
Dudley's request. The trial court's decision was proper for several reasons. 
First, while the state court may have some authority to hear the issues associated with 
the Federal Lawsuit, it was not properly characterized as supplemental jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(a). Dudley was effectively attempting to consolidate the actions. If he wished 
to consolidate, he should have attempted to remove the eviction action to federal court and 
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consolidate the actions. Alternatively, he could have asserted counterclaims in this matter, 
and he elected not to do so. 
Second, by asking the Court to take jurisdiction over all the claims alleged in the 
Federal Lawsuit, Dudley was essentially asking the trial court to amend his Answer and allow 
the new claims and parties to be added on the day of trial. The Federal Lawsuit contained 
twenty-nine (29) separate causes of action against Utah First, as well as other parties who are 
not parties to this action. Dudley had ample opportunity to file counterclaims and/or third-
party claims when he initially answered this action or well in advance of trial. He did not do 
so. He never filed any counterclaims or third-party claims, and he never filed a motion to 
amend his Answer to include such claims. Even if the Motion to Exercise Supplemental 
Jurisdiction could be considered a motion to amend, it was untimely as it was filed on the day 
of trial, and was prejudicial to Utah First who was ready to proceed with its presentation of 
evidence. 
With respect to a motion to amend pleadings, the trial court considers several factors: 
Trial courts should liberally allow amendments unless the amendments include 
untimely, unjustified, and prejudicial factors. Trial courts are not required to find all 
three factors to deny a motion to amend; a court's ruling on a motion to amend can be 
predicated on only one or two of the particular factors. And many other factors, such 
as delay, bad faith, or futility of the amendment, may weigh against the trial court's 
allowing amendment. 
Daniels v. Gamma West Br achy therapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, 1J58, 221 P.3d 256 
(citations omitted). 
The case was already at trial by the time Dudley brought his Motion to Take 
Supplemental Jurisdiction. To allow the additional claims to be brought at that point would 
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have unfairly prejudiced Utah First. Utah First would have been deprived the opportunity 
to have many of the claims eliminated as a matter of law prior to trial (which is what actually 
occurred in the Federal Lawsuit). Utah First did not have the opportunity to conduct any 
necessary discovery, and was not prepared to address the large number of additional claims 
presented at trial for the first time. Additionally, continuing the trial while such other claims 
were adjudicated would have violated Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-810(l)(b), which requires 
a trial in the unlawful detainer action within 60 days. Furthermore, such delay would have 
only added to the harm suffered by Plaintiff while it bore the full carrying cost of a 
delinquent $1.5 million debt, without the ability to collect on the collateral. 
V. Utah First is entitled to an award of attorney's fees associated with this appeal 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-811, Utah First is entitled to an award of its 
reasonable attorneys' fees associated with this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellee Utah First requests that this Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s Q J L day of June, 2011. 
SCALLEY READING BATES 
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C. 
_M 
Darwin H. Bingham 
Jonathan H. Rupp 
Attorneys for Utah First Federal Credit Union 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT 
UNION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN DUDLEY and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 100905635 
Judge Deno Himonas 
This matter came on for trial on June 21 and29,2010, and July 15,2010. Darwin Bingham 
and Jonathan Rupp represented the plaintiff, Utah First Federal Credit Union ("Utah First"). Clayne 
Corey represented the defendant, John Dudley. The Court having heard the arguments of the parties 
and the testimony of the witnesses, and having reviewed the parties' briefing and the documentary 
evidence presented, enters the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth below. 
SUMMARY 
Utah First claims to have acquired title to the home at 8028 South Madsen Court, Sandy, 
Utah (the "Property"), on March 18,2010, through a foreclosure sale. Eleven days later, Utah First 
filed a Complaint for Eviction. The Complaint alleges that Dudley, despite having received a Notice 
to Vacate, has "refused to surrender the Property.. and [is] guilty of unlawful detainer." Complaint, 
p. 2, ff 6-8. Dudley counters that he properly exercised his rescission rights under the Truth in 
Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1501, etseq., prior to the foreclosure sale and, therefore, that 
\ I Q / / ) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
? 
the sale is void. See, e.g., Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Dudley is incorrect. While the paperwork behind the loan from Utah First to Dudley is not 
worthy of imitation, Utah First did make all necessary "material disclosures," as that term is defined 
by TELA. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(u) & 1635(a); see also 12 CFR § 226.23, n. 48.1 As a 
consequence, the three-year rescission period found in Sectionl635 of TILA, and on which Dudley 
necessarily relies, is inapplicable. Utah First is entitled to restitution of the Property and to damages 
as asserted in the Complaint.2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 16, 2007, Dudley executed an Adjustable Rate Note (the "Note"), 
wherein he borrowed $ 1,560,000.00 from Utah First. The words, "ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE" 
are clearly and conspicuously printed at the top of the document. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 (emphasis in 
original).3 
2. Dudley agreed to repay the principal amount of the Note, plus interest according to 
the terms and conditions set forth in the Note. Dudley is an experienced and sophisticated 
1The Court has endeavored to use the codes in place as of November 16, 2007, the date of the 
loan closing. 
2Dudley has filed a Motion to Re-frame Trial Structure, Stay Damages and Supplemental 
Jurisdiction (the "Motion"). For the reasons set forth in Utah First's Memorandum in Opposition, the 
Court denies the Motion. 
3The highlighting and underlining on Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 & 2 are the Courts. 
2 
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businessman. The Court finds incredible Dudley's claim that he was a hapless dupe who had no idea 
what he was signing and categorically rejects the same. 
3. The Note provided for a fixed rate of interest for five (5) years, and then switched to 
a variable rate of interest thereafter.4 
4. To secure performance of his obligations under the Note, Dudley granted Utah First 
a security interest in the Property by executing a Deed of Trust, naming Utah First as beneficiary. 
The Deed of Trust was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
5. Prior to the closing of the loan, Utah First provided Dudley a Good Faith Estimate 
that set forth the charges associated with the Note. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 is a good faith estimate that 
indicates it was prepared on November 15, 2007, and signed by Dudley on that same date. 
6. The closing of the loan occurred on November 16, 2007. At the closing the Dudley 
was provided three (3) copies of a Notice of Right to Cancel. Dudley was also given the Settlement 
Statement (Plaintiffs Exhibit 13), and a number of other documents. 
7. The Notice of Right to Cancel clearly explained Dudley's right to cancel the Note. 
8. The Notice of Right to Cancel contained language necessary to make it an appropriate 
form that Dudley could have used to rescind the Note. 
It does appear that Dudley initially approached Utah First about obtaining a fixed rate loan. See, 
e.g., Defendant's Exhibit 10. It further appears, however, that the loan was a work in progress that was 
ultimately structured, with Dudley's consent, as a variable rate loan. 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9. At the closing, Dudley was given the opportunity to sign a confirmation (the 
"Confirmation") that the three-day rescission had passed. Dudley was not required to sign the 
Confirmation at closing, but was given the option of signing the Confirmation as a convenience to 
him. Dudley was also given the opportunity to bring the Confirmation back three days later if he 
chose not to sign it at the closing. 
10. Dudley was given three business days in which he could have rescinded the Note. 
In fact, the loan did not fund until four business days after closing. 
11. Dudley was not required to waive his right of rescission and was not required to sign 
the confirmation that three business days had lapsed at closing as a condition for obtaining the funds 
under the Note. 
12. The Court finds Dudley voluntarily chose to sign the confirmation section on the 
Notice of Right to Cancel as a convenience to him. 
13. Also at closing, Defendant was given a Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement. The 
Truth in Lending Disclosure Statement: 
a. Identified the lender in the upper-left-hand corner; 
b. Contained a table that clearly stated the amount financed; 
c. Stated that the borrower had the right to receive an itemization of the amount 
financed; 
d. Clearly stated the finance charge; 
e. Stated the annual percentage rate; 
f. Clearly stated the amount financed and the total of payments; 
4 
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g. Stated the number of payments and due date; 
h. Contained descriptive explanations of the terms "amount financed", "finance 
charge", "annual percentage rate", "total of payments"; 
i„ Contained a statement that security is being taken in the property and provided the 
address; 
j . Stated any dollar charge or percentage amount which may be imposed by a creditor 
solely on account of a late payment; 
L Stated that borrower will not pay a penalty if the loan is paid off early and will not 
be entitled to a refund of part of the finance charge; 
1. Contained a statement that the consumer should refer to the appropriate contract 
document for any information such document provides about nonpayment, default, 
the right to accelerate the maturity of the debt, and prepayment rebates and penalties; 
and 
m. Stated, "Assumption: someone buying your home may, subject to conditions, be 
allowed to assume the remainder of this mortgage on the original terms."5 
14. Dudley elected to receive an itemization of the amount financed and was thus 
provided with the Settlement Statement that accurately reflected the finance charges.6 
Upon reflection, it is the Court's view the lender bears the burden of establishing compliance 
with 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)'s disclosure requirements. But see McKinney v. Nationscredit Financial 
Services Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24438, *16 (N.D. IL 2004); Wilson v. Homeowner's Loan Corp., 
263 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1216 (E.D. MO 2003). Utah First has carried this burden. 
6The Court finds that the $42.99 charge for "Survey to Pest Inspection to the Cottonwood 
Improvement District" is not a "finance charge" as that term is used within 15 U.S.C. § 1605. 
5 1 n rA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
15. The transaction surrounding Dudley's execution of the Note was not for the sale of 
any property or services. 
16. The proceeds advanced under the Note were not for the purchase of the Property. 
17. At the time the Note was executed, the amount borrowed by the Defendant under the 
Note did not exceed the fair market value of the Property. 
18. Defendant failed to make the monthly payments required by the Note. 
19. Plaintiff appropriately commenced foreclosure proceedings due to Dudley5 s failure 
to make timely payment as required by the Note. 
20. Prior to the foreclosure sale of the Property, Dudley attempted to rescind the Note. 
The evidence presented shows the Dudley may have attempted to rescind the Note as early as 
February 2,2010, or as late as March 18, 2010. 
21. Dudley has never attempted to tender back to Utah First the funds he received under 
the Note. 
22. On March 18, 2010, a foreclosure sale was conducted and Utah First purchased the 
Property for $900,000.00 as the highest bidder. 
23. On March 22,2010, a Notice to Vacate was served on Dudley and all other occupants 
of the Property. 
24. The Notice to Vacate expired on March 27, 2010. 
25. Dudley filed a complaint for eviction on March 29, 2010. 
26. To date, Dudley has not vacated the Property. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its: 
6 \2h\ 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The disclosures, provided to Dudley prior to and at closing of the loan complied with 
the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(u) & 1635(a) and 
(f); see also 12 CFR § 226.23, n. 48. 
TELA requires consumers to file damage claims 'within one year from the date of the 
occurrence of the violation.5 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). The violations plaintiffs allege, 
failure to received required disclosure and rescission notices, occurred on or before 
the transactions were consummated.... Plaintiffs claims for rescission, however 
are subject to a different standard. The regulations give consumers three days from 
the delivery of the notice to rescind or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever 
occurs last, to rescind a transaction.... Material disclosure means the disclosure .. 
. of the annual percentage rate, the method of determining the finance charge and the 
balance upon which the finance charge will be imposed, the amount of the finance 
charge, the amount to be financed, the total of the payments, the number and amount 
of the payments [and] the due dates or periods of payments scheduled to repay the 
indebtedness. 
Pulphus v. Sullivan, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7080, **36-37 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
2. The charges in the Good Faith Estimate are within the allowable tolerances required 
by TILA and the settlement charge for the pest inspection to the Cottonwood Improvement District 
do not constitute a finance charge. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(e). 
i 
3. Dudley was provided three business days to rescind the transaction as required by 
TELA. 
4. Dudley5 s rescission rights under TELA expired on November 20,2007, which is three 
business days after the closing. 
5. Dudley failed to exercise his rescission rights before they expired. 
6. Dudley's attempts to rescind the Note onFebruary 2,2010 and March 18,2010, were 
without effect because the Dudley had no rescission rights. 
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7. Because Dudley's attempt to rescind the Note was not based upon a valid right of 
rescission, Utah First was not required to stop the foreclosure sale and was not required to file a legal 
proceeding prior to completing the foreclosure sale. 
8. Because Dudley has no legal right to rescind the Note, the foreclosure of the Property 
was proper. 
9. Utah First became the legal owner of the Property as the highest bidder at the 
foreclosure sale. 
11. Dudley and other individuals claiming a right of occupancy through him have been 
unlawfully detaining in the Property from March 27, 2010, until the date of these Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
12. Utah First is entitled to an Order of Restitution giving it possession of the Property. 
(Utah First is to prepare, circulate, and submit an appropriate Order and Writ of Restitution.) 
13. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Utah First and against Dudley for Dudley's 
unlawful detainer damages in the amount of $16,275.60, which is three times the daily rent of 
$147.96 for a period of 110 days from March 27,2010, through July 15,2010. Said judgment shall 
be automatically augmented by $147.96 for each day after July 15, 2010, that Dudley or any other 
occupant remains in the Property. 
14. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Utah First against Dudley for Utah First's 
reasonable attorneys fees. Utah First's counsel shall submit an affidavit of attorneys fees and costs 
v 
and Dudley may obj ect as appropriate. 
15. Dudley's bond in the amount of $4,500.00 is hereby released to Utah First. 
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16. The surety bond in the amount of $4,500.00 filed by Utah First is hereby released and 
the surety on Utah First's bond is relieved from any further liability. 
17. The Court declines to stay, re-frame, or exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any 
other claims, issues, or matters. 
fJi DATED t h i s ^ 2 3 a y of August, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
Den^^nimona: 
Third District Court Judg< 
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